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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF THE OIL IMPORT QUOTA
YORAM BARZEL and CHRISTOPHER D. HALL
Stanford, California, Hoover Institution
Press, 1977. Pp. 96, $8.95.
This book is the first of a series of studies of public issues sponsored by the Domestic Studies Program of the Hoover Institution. It
comes well recommended; the praises for the book from a list of
distinguished scholars (Cootner, Dam, Tullock, Stigler) quoted on
the dust jacket and in the Preface are almost intimidating to the
reviewer. It must be admitted, however, that their evaluations are
justified by the text, which sets a high standard for future volumes in
the series.
The subject is not an unfamiliar one. The oil import quota system
has been studied before, and it is the subject of a recently published
treatise from Resources for the Future.' Those interested in energy
policy will find the Barzel and Hall volume to be a useful compendium of facts, including some that have not been noticed in other
studies. Its chief contribution, however, is its analysis of the interaction of government regulation and the private economy. The analysis is set in the context of the particular policy of import control,
but it uses analytical economics and some emerging theoretical insights of political economy.
Of course, in some respects oil import control policy is a sitting
duck. Like the more recent incarnation of energy policy, the quota
system of 1959 to 1973 was a notable example of inept administration, confused objectives, inappropriate instruments, unanticipated
effects, and general policy disintegration. Barzel and Hall point out,
often with wry humor, the manifestations of those problems. Their
analysis of these aspects (such as the effects of the overland restriction, the special treatment of the West Coast, and the special treatment of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) is sharp and incisive.
Their discussion of the petrochemical problem and their analysis of
the brokerage and distribution of the rents that import restrictions
generated are especially good.
This reviewer's only complaint, apart from a few instances of careless editing and proofreading, is that the authors' introduction gives a
somewhat misleading impression of the thrust of the book. The
introduction concentrates almost entirely on a single point: that oil
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is not a homogeneous commodity, and a regulatory system which
assumes that it is homogeneous (as the Mandatory Oil Import Program did, in effect) will create difficulties and distortions in its
pricing and allocation. The remainder of the book does indeed address that problem, and shows that the program produced a bias
toward high-priced, high-value imports which affected the whole subsequent product structure. But this problem is one among many
elements of the program that the book discusses.
What the book shows is that the regulations did not and probably
could not integrate this highly complex market into a system of
control consistent with the ostensible ends of the program. They did
not anticipate or direct the reactions of the multitude of firms and
other interested parties to the control system. They could not withstand counter-pressures. Regulations and allocations not only failed
to solve any problems, they also made two or three new ones grow
from the stalk of every old one. Barzel and Hall obviously intended
to develop a rich and animated picture of the interactions between
public regulation and private enterprise in a dynamic mode, accenting the object lessons for those who would make elementary static
economic models the basis for a simply conceived and statically
oriented regulatory policy. In this aim they have succeeded brilliantly.
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